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Conner: Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason University, 993 F.2D 386 (4t

CASE SUMMARIES
Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason
University,
993 F.2D 386

(4TH CIR.

1993).

Introduction
George Mason University sanctioned the Sigma Chi fraternity for conducting
an "ugly woman contest" because it allegedly had racial and sexual overtones.
Sigma Chi brought suit against George Mason University seeking a declaratory
judgement that the sanctions were violative of the First Amendment. The District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted summary judgment to Sigma
Chi on the First Amendment claim. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision of the District Court, holding that there was
no outstanding issue of material fact as to whether the fraternity's conduct was
expressive.
Facts
The IOTA XI Chapter of Sigma Chi fraternity ("the Fraternity") held an "ugly
woman contest" during its annual Derby Days event in order to raise funds for
charity. During the contest, "fraternity members appeared as caricatures of different types of women", including one of a black woman with stringy black hair in
curlers and exaggerated breasts" and buttocks.
Following the contest, over two hundred students signed a petition protesting
the event as racist and sexist in nature. The Dean of Student Affairs discussed
the situation with representatives of the objecting students, the Fraternity, and
student government. George Mason University ("the University") found that the
Fraternity's "behavior created a hostile leaming environment for women and
blacks." Multiple sanctions were then imposed on the Fraternity.
The Fraternity brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to nullify the imposition of the sanctions as violative of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The
University submitted an affidavit describing the University's "mission" as one
"committed to promoting a culturally and racially diverse student body" and
"committed to teaching the values of equal opportunity and equal treatment."' It
maintained that such a "mission" could not be attained "if behavior like that of
Sigma Chi is perpetuated on ... campus."2 The District Court granted the Fra-

1. Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason University, 933 F.2d 386, 388 (4th Cir. 1993).
2. Id. at 389.
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ternity summary judgment on its First Amendment claim, and the University
appealed.
Legal Analysis
The issue before the court was whether the ugly woman contest was sufficiently expressive to bring it within First Amendment protection. The court used
two different analytical approaches to determine this issue. First, the court noted
that short of obscenity, live entertainment is generally protected under the First
Amendment. Live entertainment that is devoid of "ideas," but with entertainment
value, may also be protected because it is too difficult to distinguish the line
between the informing and the entertaining.3
The court held that the low quality of the entertainment here was not a consideration in deciding whether First Amendment protection was warranted. The
court noted that "unquestionably, some forms of entertainment are so inherently
expressive as to fall within the First Amendment's ambit regardless of their
quality." 4 Music5 , motion pictures6 and crude street skits7 were cited as examples. The Supreme Court's concession in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.8 was also
cited. The Court in Barnes found that nude dancing is expressive conduct entitled to First Amendment protection because it is "inherently expressive entertainment" conveying emotions and ideas understood by its viewers.' The
Fraternity's skit, as "inherently expressive entertainment" was therefore entitled
to First Amendment protection regardless of its low quality of entertainment.
The second approach the court used to decide whether the "ugly woman contest" was protected by the First Amendment focused on the Fraternity's intent,
by their conduct, to communicate a message to the observers. The expressive
conduct test used by the court to make this determinaton involved two parts. The
first prong was whether an intent to convey a particularized message was present. The second prong was whether the likelihood was great that the message
would be understood by those who viewed it.'0
The court found that the Fraternity had the requisite intent to convey a particularized message. The Fraternity intended to convey the message that the University's policies concerning racial and sexual themes should be taken less seriously. The affidavits filed by the University officials showed that they believed
the Fraternity intended to convey a message. Also, the Fraternity members apology, post-conduct contriteness, and purposeful nonsensical treatment of the sexual
and racial themes showed that the Fraternity intended to convey a message. The

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507. 510 (1948).
Sigma Chi 933 F.2d at 390.
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989), reh'g denied. 492 U.S. 937 (1989).
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970).
111 S.Ct. 2456, 2460 (1991).

9. id.
10. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (quoting Spence v. Washington. 418 U.S. 405
(1974)).
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court found that no evidence suggested that the Fraternity advocated segregation
or inferior social status for women.
The court found that the second prong of the expressive conduct test was also
satisfied. There was a "great likelihood that at least some of the audience viewing the skit understood the Fraternity's message of satire and humor." This was
evident since "some students paid to attend the performance and were entertained." Despite the sparsity of evidence in the record, the court concluded that
the Fraternity's "ugly woman contest" satisfied the test for expressive conduct.
The court noted that its decision to protect the Fraternity's conduct was consistent with recent content and viewpoint discrimination cases. In R.A.V. v. City
of St. Paul," the Court struck down the City of St. Paul's hate speech ordinance
which prohibited views that ran counter to the city's ideas of racial or religious
equality. St. Paul's city ordinance prohibited displays of symbols that aroused
anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or
gender, but permitted displays of symbols which advanced ideas of racial or
relgious equality. "The First Amendment does not permit St. Paul to impose
prohibitions on those who express views on disfavored subjects."' 2 Likewise,
the University may not sanction the Fraternity for the message conveyed by the
"ugly woman contest" because it went against the views supported by the University, while permitting consistent views. The problem was the University's
punishment of those who disagreed with its goals of racial integration and gender
neutrality while encouraging those that would further the University's viewpoint.
The court also noted, without elaborating, that the University had a substantial
interest in maintaining an educational environment free of discrimination and
racism, and in providing gender-neutral education. However, there were numerous alternatives to imposing punishment on students based on the viewpoints
they express. The First Amendment forbids the government from restricting
expression because of the message or ideas expressed. 3 Thus, the majority concluded that the University must not regulate speech based on its content or viewpoint.
The concurring opinion agreed with the majority's affirmance of the district
court's grant of summary judgment for the Fraternity, but felt that the reasoning
unnecessarily went too far beyond the contours of the requirements of the First
Amendment. According to the concurrence, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that a content-based regulation of protected expression survives judicial
scrutiny if it is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly
drawn to achieve that end. 4 The concurrence noted that the educational forum
is unique in nature. Since universities are maintained primarily for the benefit of
the student body, Universities must maintain the ability to refuse to sanction
certain behavior which infringes on the rights of other students. While the con-

11. 112 S.Ct. 2538 (1992).
12. Id. at 2541, 2547.
13. Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
14. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York Crime Victims Bd.. 112 S. Ct. 501. 509 (1991) (quoting
Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987)).
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currence found that forbidding the skit or requiring substantial amendment was
not beyond the University's power, its finding of unconstitutionality was based
on the University's "unrevoked permission to give the skit."
Conclusion
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's granting
summary judgment to the Fraternity on the First Amendment issue since there
was no outstanding issue of material fact. The fraternity's "ugly woman contest"
was "inherently expressive" and entitled to protection under the First Amendment. Alternatively, the Fraternity had the requisite intent to convey the particularized message that the University's views on race and gender should be taken
less seriously and this message was understood by those students who paid to
view the skit and were entertained. Finally, the University could not further its
"mission" by regulating speech on the basis of its content of viewpoint. Thus, the
First Amendment prohibited the University from sanctioning the Fraternity.
BarbaraJ. Conner
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